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1. See MARK KURLANSKY,COD:ABIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT CHANGED THE WORLD
68-70 (1997).
2. See Brief History of the Groundfishing Industry of New England,
http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/history/stories/groundfish/grndfsh1.html (last visited Dec. 5,
2008); see Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D. D.C. 2001).
3. Margreta Vellucci, Fishing for the Truth: Achieving the “Best Available Science”
by Forging a Middle Ground between Mainstream Scientists and Fishermen, 30-SPG
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 275, 279-80 (2000); see also Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 7
(discussing collapse of New England groundfish fishery).
4. “The terms ‘overfishing’ and ‘overfished’ mean a rate or level of fishing mortality
that jeopardizes the capacity of a fishery to produce the maximum sustainable yield on a
continuing basis.” 16 U.S.C. § 1802(29) (2007).
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MANAGING A FISHERY THROUGH CONTRACT:
LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY SECTOR OPERATING




New England boasts one of the most productive marine ecosystems in the
world.  It has a long and rich tradition of fishing and has supported large scale
commercial fisheries for cod and other groundfish (e.g., haddock and
flounder) for centuries.1  The region also has a less envious tradition of
fishery management failures including the “collapse” of a number of
groundfish stocks in the 1990s.2  Before 1977, the groundfish fishery was
practically unregulated and was open to local and international fishing fleets
alike.3  Overfishing4 caused dramatic declines in many fish stocks in New
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5. See Vellucci, supra note 3, at 279 (“In 2004, the [National Marine Fisheries Services]
reviewed 236 stocks of fish and identified 44 stocks that were being overexploited. . . . [I]t
examined 200 stocks of fish and identified 53 stocks as overfished; the status of 113 stocks
was unknown.”) (citation omitted); see André Verani, Community-Based Management of
Atlantic Cod by the Georges Bank Hook Sector: Is It a Model Fishery?, 20 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
359, 361-65 (providing a history of Atlantic cod and the fishery’s collapse).   
6. See 16 U.S.C. § 1802(11) (providing the definition of Exclusive Economic Zone).
7. Patricia Pinto da Silva & Andrew Kitts, Collaborative Fisheries Management in the
Northeast US: Emerging Initiatives and Future Directions, 30 MARINE POL’Y 832, 832-33
(2006). 
8. See About the NEFMC, http://www.nefmc.org/about/index.htm (last visited Dec. 5,
2008).
9. See 50 C.F.R. § 648 (2007).
10. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D. D.C. 2001).
11. Id. at 6 n.4 (citing Conservation Law Found. v. Mineta, 131 F. Supp. 2d 19, 21 n.2
(D. D.C. 2001)); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1851.  The national standards require the Secretary
and his or her designees to: 
(1) prevent overfishing and maintain ‘optimum yield’; (2) base conservation on the
best available scientific information available; (3) manage each stock of fish as an
individual unit; (4) fairly and equitably allocate fishing privileges among the states;
(5) be efficient in the utilization of fishery resources; (6) take into account variations
and contingencies in fishery resources; (7) minimize costs and unnecessary
duplication; (8) minimize adverse economic impacts on communities; (9) minimize
bycatch and the mortality of bycatch; and (10) promote the safety of human life at sea.
Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 6 n.4.  
12. Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996).
England and other regions,5 prompting passage of the Fishery Conservation
Management Act (known as the Magnuson-Stevens Act), which allowed the
federal government to regulate fisheries out to 200 miles.6
The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) created a fishery system that
revolved around regional management councils, which developed and imple-
mented fishery management plans (FMPs) and directed fishermen in their
activities.7  The New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) has
management authority over the New England multispecies groundfish
fishery.8  It implemented a series of fishery management plans for the north-
eastern United States.  These plans adopted a broad suite of management
measures designed to achieve the fishing mortality targets necessary to
rebuild certain overfished stocks and aspired to meet other requirements of
the MSA.9
When a regional council develops an FMP, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), acting on behalf of the Secretary of Commerce,10 evaluate
it for compliance with the ten national standards set forth in the MSA,11 as
amended by the Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA).12
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13. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 5. 
14. Id. at 1.  “The term ‘bycatch’ means fish which are harvested in a fishery, but which
are not sold or kept for personal use, and includes economic discards and regulatory
discards.  Such term does not include fish released alive under a recreational catch and
release fishery management program.”  16 U.S.C. § 1802(2).
15. DANIEL S. HOLLAND, COMMUNITY-BASED SECTORS FOR THE NEW ENGLAND
GROUNDFISH FISHERY 8 (2007), available at http://www.gmri.org/upload/files/RES_DH_
reports_Community%20Based%20Sectors%20Final%20Report.pdf. 
16. 50 C.F.R. § 648.87 (2007).
17. This article explores community-based management in the form of sectors in contrast
to a more centralized governance regime in which the government attempts, through
regulation and enforcement, to induce fishermen to change their actions.  Another fisheries
management approach not discussed at length here is that of generating private property
interests in the fishery such that fishermen, by owning the right to fish for a portion of the
fish stocks, have an inherent incentive to conserve and manage the resource.  See e.g.,
Jonathan H. Adler, Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries, 8 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. Rev. 9, 10 (2003).  The aversion to such private property systems in the
United States, as well as the governments’ inability to implement them effectively, is one
factor contributing to the popularity of community-based management as an alternative to
the “command and control” system.  See Joseph M. Sullivan, Harvesting Cooperatives in
U.S. Antitrust Law Recent Developments and Implications 9 (2000) [hereinafter Sullivan]
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
18. 50 C.F.R. § 648.87(b)(2).
19. The National Sea Grant Law Center conducts and coordinates research on issues of
ocean and coastal law and policy.  See The National Sea Grant Law Center, http://www.
olemiss.edu/orgs/SGLC/lawcenterhome.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2008).
A 2001 lawsuit by the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) against the
Secretary of Commerce, NOAA, and NFMS alleged that plans for rebuild-
ing groundfish stocks failed to meet the national standards.13  CLF argued
that the plans failed to adequately mitigate overfishing practices or to
comply with bycatch restrictions.14  The lawsuit’s settlement led to Amend-
ment 13 of the FMP.15  Among other things, Amendment 13 made possible
a new style of fishery management for the New England multispecies
groundfish fishery, namely, the creation of harvesting cooperatives known
as “sectors.”16
Sectors are a form of community-based fisheries management.  They
require that groups of fishermen join together and agree to manage them-
selves collectively.17  By law, fishermen are obliged to sign a formal contract
setting forth the key terms of their cooperative arrangement.18  The novelty
and complexity of these contracts requires specialized legal drafting.
Pursuant to a grant from the National Sea Grant Law Center,19 the
University of Maine School of Law, in partnership with the Gulf of Maine
Research Institute, and the New England office of the Ocean Conservancy,
convened a workshop in November 2007, to address key legal issues raised
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20. See Sector Workshop Blog Archive, http://mainelaw.maine.edu/mli/sectorWorkshop/
index.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2008) (containing workshop materials including power point
presentations, archives of live blog from workshop, and detailed notes of all workshop
proceedings).  
21. Donald R. Leal, Community-Run Fisheries: Avoiding the “Tragedy of the
Commons,” http://www.perc.org/articles/article652.php (citing Svein Jentoff & Trond
Kristoffersen, Fishermen’s Co-management: The Case of the Lofoten Fishery, 48 HUMAN
ORG. 355, 355 (1989)).
22. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
23. Leal, supra note 21 (describing family groups organized by Tlingit and Haida Indians
of Alaska to control access to sockeye salmon runs and Indian tribes of Washington State
with similar salmon fishing traditions).
by sector operating agreements.20  This article summarizes the Sector
Workshop’s proceedings by highlighting the major legal issues discussed
at the meeting.  Part II describes community-based management generally
and sectors as a management tool for the New England multispecies
fishery.  Part III discusses the legal issues to be resolved in sector operating
agreements and reflects some of the specific concerns and suggestions
raised by the workshop participants.  Part IV concludes with reflections on
sectors as a management tool and provides information on resources for
those in the New England multispecies fishing industry who are con-
sidering forming or joining a sector.
II. COMMUNITY-BASED FISHERIES MANAGEMENT:
A SOLUTION FOR NEW ENGLAND?
A.  Controlling a Fishery Through Community Norms
Community-run fisheries and collective practices are neither unique nor
necessarily modern innovations.  Scholars have long been studying and
describing “community-based, spontaneously developed and informally
organized” arrangements21 that appear to avoid the “tragedy of the
commons” problem first described by Garrett Hardin.22
Early Native American communities managed fishing resources
through controlled access practices and enforcement of meaningful conse-
quences for breach of such traditions.23  For years, the lobster fishery off
Maine islands has been managed by informal agreements among fishermen
relying on their own private enforcement means.  Off Matinicus Island, for
example, all lobster fishers have been either island residents or resident-
sponsored.  Fishermen control access to fishing grounds by imposing take
measures to discourage others from setting traps within islanders’ territory
2008] Managing Fisheries Through Contract 21
24. Id.  Anthropologist James Acheson describes the social groupings of some of Maine’s
lobster fishing communities as “harbor gangs”:
Membership in a harbor gang strongly influences many aspects of a lobster
fisherman’s career.  Most importantly, it controls entry into the industry.  To go
lobster fishing, a man must first become a member of a harbor gang.  Once he has
gained admission, he can go fishing only the territory ‘owned’ communally by
members of that gang.  Fishermen who place their traps in the territory of another
gang can expect swift retribution, normally the purposeful destruction of their gear.
Although those territories and the gangs that own them are completely unrecognized
by the state, they are a long-standing reality.  
JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 48-49 (1988).
25. Leal, supra note 21 (arguing that this arrangement produced a sustainable fishery
until government intervened to “modernize” the fishery after which it ultimately collapsed).
26. Id.  (stating that some fishers have been frozen out of the industry because federal
authorities in Canada now require fishermen to hold licenses).
27. Id.
28. Id. (“Usually, a strong community tradition is essential for such management, as well
as absence of interference by governments.”).
29. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 1.
30. Id. at 1-2.  Sullivan explains that in the U.S. Pacific Northwest many factors exist that
and by using self-imposed conservation measures such as trap limits.24
Several other examples of successful community-based management
approaches—with and without government sanction or assistance—exist
in fisheries around the world.  Fishers of a mixed fishery in Valensa, Brazil
resolved years of conflict and gear entanglement by dividing their estuary
into fishing zones.25  Like island lobstermen in Maine, fishers off the Nova
Scotia coast informally divided their fishing grounds into gear-specific
territories that they fiercely defended against outsiders.26  With government
involvement, similar arrangements have existed in Norway’s Lofoten
commercial cod fishery, Scotland’s salmon fishery, and throughout Japan’s
network of fishing cooperatives.27
Community-based management systems tend to prosper when bound-
aries are well defined, rules are linked to local conditions, and sanctions are
imposed for rule violations.28  Additional characteristics that support pri-
vate agreements to allocate fish harvesting privileges include: (1) a
relatively small number of participants sharing a similar “community of
interest”; (2) an effective system for gathering fishery harvest data; (3)
accurate data verification and monitoring to ensure compliance; (4) an
ability to enforce the agreement in cases of non-compliance; (5) barriers to
new, “free-riding” participants; and (6) an incentive to join the group and
conform to its rules.29
Many of these conditions were present in the Pacific Northwest in the
1990s.30 Government regulation of fisheries in the Pacific Northwest was
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created “opportunities and incentives for a significant subset of U.S. fishermen in these
fisheries to seek rationalization through private agreement.”  Id. at 2.
31. Id. at 1-2.
32. Id.; see MARGARET PETRUNY-PARKER ET AL.,RHODE ISLAND SEA GRANT PROGRAM,
WHO GETS THE FISH? PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW ENGLAND WORKSHOPS ON RIGHTS-BASED
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT APPROACHES 3-5 (2003), available at http://seagrant.gso.uri.edu/
bookstore/rights_fish_workshop.pdf (describing merits and pitfalls of rights-based and
community-based management approaches).
33. Andrew W. Kitts & Steven F. Edwards, Cooperatives in U.S. Fisheries: Realizing
the Potential of the Fishermen’s Collective Marketing Act, 27 MARINE POL’Y 357, 359
(2003).  
34. Id. at 357.  The Pacific Fishery Management Council is one of the eight regional
councils created by the Magnuson-Stevens Act.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(5).
35. Kitts & Edwards, supra note 33, at 357.
36. American Fisheries Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-616 (1998).
37. Kitts & Edwards, supra note 33, at 357.
inefficient and unsuccessful,31 and the clumsy consideration of an
individual fishing quota (IFQ) system caused fishermen to look for more
certain options over which they had some control.32
B.  Cooperatives in the U.S. Pacific Northwest
The prototypes for New England groundfish sectors are the cooperative
harvesting arrangements in the U.S. Pacific Northwest.  The first formal
harvest cooperative in this region was the Pacific Whiting Conservation
Cooperative (Pacific whiting fishery), formed in 1997, by vessel owners
participating in the off-shore whiting fishery.33  Four catcher/processor
companies privately negotiated an arrangement that specified each
member’s share of the total catch allocated to their sector by the Pacific
Fishery Management Council.34
Vessel owners in the Bering Sea pollock fishery, inspired by the
economic success of the whiting fishery cooperative, lobbied Congress for
permission to form pollock cooperatives.35  Their persistence resulted in the
American Fisheries Act of 1998,36 which allowed the formation of two
pollock harvest cooperatives in 1999.37
Joseph Sullivan, an attorney in Seattle, Washington, assisted the
pollock cooperatives in preparing their operating agreement and working
through thorny legal issues, including antitrust concerns.  He describes the
ways in which harvesting cooperatives may be ever more prevalent in the
U.S. Pacific Coast and Alaska fisheries:
Limited entry systems are prevalent.  Fishery sectors are increas-
ingly segregated by species and gear-specific licensing systems,
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38. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 2.
39. Joseph R. Sullivan, Remarks at the Sector Operating Agreements Workshop,
http://mainelaw.maine.edu/mli/sectorWorkshop/ent03.html [hereinafter Sullivan Remarks]
(last visited Dec. 5, 2008).
40. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D. D.C. 2001).
41. Id. at 5-6 (quotation marks omitted).  According to Evans, “[a] framework adjustment
is comprised of management measures which would achieve the fishing mortality objectives
of an FMP.”  Id. at 5 n.5 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 648.90).
which restrict eligibility to fishermen with recent participation
above marginal thresholds.  Anecdotal information from fishermen
suggests that the expense of adding harvesting capacity has in-
creased as fishery technology has improved, while product markets
have become increasingly competitive as a result of globalization
and new information technology.  Thus, the costs of continuing to
compete in an olympic fishery has made doing so progressively
less attractive. . . . Many Pacific Coast and Alaskan fisheries are
managed on the basis of total allowable catch (“TACs”) or
guideline harvest levels which, when attained, trigger closure of all
fishing until the next season.  Given these factors, there are
opportunities and incentives for a significant subset of U.S.
fishermen in these fisheries to seek rationalization through private
agreement.38
C. “Sectors” in New England
Whereas the term “cooperative” has been applied consistently to groups
of fishermen in the Pacific Northwest joining together to allocate
harvesting privileges, in New England the same type of arrangement is
known as a fishing “sector.”  This can create some confusion because the
term “sector” is also used in the Pacific Northwest to refer to a particular
section of a fishery (e.g., an inshore sector and an offshore sector).39
Throughout this article, the term “sector” will be used as a synonym for
“cooperative” to refer to the collective activity of several fishing vessel
owners who seek to allocate fishing privileges through a private agreement.
1.  Background to Amendment 13
The NEFMC performs its functions under the MSA by developing and
implementing FMPs and amendments thereto.40  FMPs are submitted to the
Secretary for approval after which they are implemented through “frame-
work adjustments.”41  Among the management measures in the Northeast
Multispecies FMP was an allocation of days at sea (DAS) for individual
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42. 59 Fed. Reg. 9872-01 (Mar. 1, 1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 651).
43. See Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 7.
44. Id. at 6. 
45. 61 Fed. Reg. 27710-01 (May 31, 1996) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 651).
46. 64 Fed. Reg. 55821-01 (Oct. 15, 1999) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).
47. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 8-11.
48. See id. at 15.  
49. See generally 50 C.F.R. § 648 (2007). 
vessels.  This measure was intended to minimize the risk of overfishing.
Implemented for the first time in Amendment 5 to the FMP in 1994,42 the
original DAS allocation, in combination with other management measures,
was inadequate to reduce fishing mortality to sustainable levels.43  The
Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996 ordered the Secretary of Commerce,
through the NEFMC, to prevent overfishing and rebuild the severely
depleted New England groundfish stocks.44
Amendment 7, adopted in 1996, accelerated the DAS allocations,
eliminated exemptions from effort controls, provided incentives for fishing
with larger mesh sizes, and broadened area closures to protect juveniles and
spawning fish.45  Amendment 9 established a new definition for overfishing
and set the optimum yield for twelve groundfish species.46  According to a
CLF lawsuit filed in 2001, however, rebuilding plans actually implemented
by the Council did not live up to the overfishing definitions of Amendment
9.47  This lawsuit resulted in a court order requiring the Secretary of Com-
merce to adopt yet another Amendment that, among other things, calculated
the total allowable catch (TAC) for all species governed by Amendment
9.48  The ultimate outcome was Amendment 13, which addresses stock
rebuilding, reduces fishing effort and capacity, and proposes measures for
additional habitat protection.49
2.  Sectors Provision of Amendment 13
For the first time in the history of the Northeast Multispecies FMP, the
official management structure, as guided by federal regulations, allows for
the formation of fishing “sectors” and the allocation of fishing privileges
unique to that sector.  The process for sector proposal and approval is set
forth in Amendment 13 to the Northeast Multispecies FMP, principally at
50 C.F.R. § 648.87 (2007).
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50. Id. § 648.87(a).
51. Id. § 648.87(b)(1)(i).  Proposed Amendment 16 eliminates the days at sea (DAS)
allocation and relies exclusively on a hard total allowable catch (TAC).  New England
Fishery Management Counsel, Draft Amendment 16 to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery
Management Plan 43 (2008), available at www.nefmc.org/nemulti/council_mtg_docs/
Draft_A16_080601.pdf [hereinafter Draft Amendment 16].  
52. 50 C.F.R. § 648.87(b)(1)(ii).  
53. Id. § 648.87(b)(1)(iii).  Sectors have an incentive to attract members with large catch
histories over the previous five years. To prove their catch histories, vessel owners must refer
to dealer landings reported to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).  Id. §
648.87(b)(iii). This has proved problematic for some vessel owners, particularly to the extent
their vessels and/or permits have been transferred in recent history.  Interview with Cindy
Smith, Sectors Project Manager & Dan Holland, Res. Economist, Gulf of Me. Research Inst.,
Portland, Me. (June 25, 2008).  NMFS requires that each permit holder authorize by
signature the release of his landings data Fishers interested in participating in a sector are
thus obliged to produce significant documentation to NMFS in exchange for release of catch
data, and this data reportedly contains errors principally from missing landings reports and
the like.  Id.  
54. Draft Amendment 16, supra note 51, at 43.
a.  Procedure for Creating and Maintaining a Sector
First, owners of limited access multispecies fishing vessels must decide
that they wish to form a sector.  At least one year in advance of the start of
the sector, they must submit a proposal to the NEFMC requesting that their
sector be implemented pursuant to a framework adjustment procedure.50
Although the New England groundfish fishery has primarily operated
under the DAS regime since the mid-1990s, a sector-based system requires
that the fishery move to a regime with a TAC on a per-stock and per-sector
basis.  Thus, in order to qualify for sector approval, the sector’s allocation
of fishing privileges must be based either on a fixed amount of fish the
sector is allowed to catch (known as a “hard TAC”) or on a maximum
number of DAS for all the vessels in the sector combined with a target
TAC.51
Each stock in the fishery has its own TAC for the fishing year.  Under
Amendment 13, if the sector is assigned a hard TAC this amount may reach
(but not exceed) twenty percent of the stock’s TAC.52  The assignment of
either a TAC or a DAS allocation is based upon “documented accumulated
catch histories of the harvested stock(s) for each vessel electing to fish in
a Sector, for the 5-year period prior to submission of a Sector allocation
proposal.”53  Under proposed Amendment 16, the hard TAC limit of twenty
percent would be lifted.54
26 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
55. 50 C.F.R. § 648.87(b)(1)(vi).
56. Id. § 648.87(b)(1)(vii).
57. Id. § 648.87(b)(1)(viii).
58. Id. § 648.87(b)(1)(xi).  
59. Id. § 648.87(b)(1)(xiii).
60. Id. § 648.87(b)(1)(xiv).
61. Id. § 648.87(b)(1)(v).  The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
62. 50 C.F.R. § 648.87(b)(2). 
If it appears a sector will exceed its TAC, the sector must cease opera-
tions for the remainder of the fishing year.55  If the TAC is actually
exceeded before operations can be stopped, the sector’s allocation for the
following fishing year is reduced by the overage “and the Sector, each
vessel, and vessel operator and/or vessel owner participating in the Sector
may be charged jointly and severally for civil penalties and permit
sanctions.”56 Although joint and several liability among sector members is
a risk to participating in a sector, one benefit is that the sector’s TAC
allocation will not be reduced for a following fishing year if other sectors
or other non-sector vessels exceed their target or hard TAC.57 In other
words, a compliant sector will not face reductions in its allocation simply
because other sectors in the fishery (or vessels not joining a sector) exceed
their harvest share. 
Once a vessel owner or operator joins a sector it must remain in the
sector for the entire fishing year.58  Similarly, if a sector member sells their
permit during the fishing year the new owner must comply with the sector
regulations and operating agreement during the remainder of the year.59  If
a vessel owner is expelled from a sector for rule violations it loses the right
to fish under New England multispecies regulations—even as a non-sector
vessel—for the remainder of the year.60
A sector will not be approved unless its proposal contains an analysis
of the sector’s environmental impact pursuant to the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA).61  The sector must also prepare and submit an
Operations Plan and Sector Contract for initial approval and for each
fishing year thereafter.62
b.  Sector Operating Agreement Terms
Amendment 13 sets forth a list of required provisions that must appear
in either the Operations Plan or the Sector Contract:
(i) A list of all parties, vessels, and vessel owners who will
participate in the Sector;
2008] Managing Fisheries Through Contract 27
63. Id. § 648.87(b)(2)(i)-(viii).
64. Id. § 648.87(b)(1)(vii)-(b)(2)(x).
(ii) A contract signed by all Sector participants indicating their
agreement to abide by the Operations Plan;
(iii) The name of a designated representative or agent for service
of process;
(iv) If applicable, a plan for consolidation and distribution of
catch or effort, detailing the quantity and duration of such
consolidation or redistribution of catch or effort within the
Sector;
(v) Historic information on the catch or effort history of the
Sector participants . . . ;
(vi) A plan and analysis of the specific management rules the
Sector participants will agree to abide by in order to avoid
exceeding the allocated TAC (or target TAC under a DAS
allocation), including detailed plans for enforcement of the
Sector rules, as well as detailed plans for the monitoring and
reporting of landings and discards;
(vii) A plan that defines the procedures by which members of the
Sector that do not abide by the rules of the Sector will be
disciplined or removed from the Sector, and a procedure for
notifying NMFS of such expulsions . . . [and]
(viii) If applicable, a plan of how the TAC or DAS allocated to
the Sector is assigned to each vessel . . . .63
Moreover, other issues must be negotiated between sector members and
addressed in the sector’s operations contract.  For instance, the parties need
to develop a system for rationing catch among members so that the sector
can determine whether and how to adjust catch allocation inside the sector.
The rights and duties of the sector manager must be determined.  Monitor-
ing is critical in a sector because the sector and its individual members can
be held jointly and severally liable for sector members who fail to comply
with federal regulations.64  Joint and several liability also compel sector
members to consider including indemnification obligations by non-
compliant members in their contract as well as possible penalty provisions
and enforcement measures. The sector contract should explicitly divide
administrative costs amongst the sector members, define eligibility for
membership, and implement a process for fishers to join and exit a sector.
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65. Among our speakers was attorney Joseph Sullivan of Mundt MacGregor in Seattle,
the author of several cooperative harvest agreements for fisheries in the Pacific Northwest
and an expert on antitrust issues in this field.  Another speaker was Donald Kassilke, a
lawyer with Sher Blackwell in Washington, D.C.  Attorney Kassilke was the primary author
of the first two contracts for sectors approved in New England: (1) the Georges Bank Hook
Sector; and (2) the Georges Bank Cod Fixed Gear Sector.  Copies of the Pollock Coopera-
tive contract and the Georges Bank Cod Hook Sector operations plan and agreement were
available to all participants.  See Cape Cod Commercial Hook Fisherman’s Association:
Georges Bank Hook Sector, http://www.ccchfa.org/pages/4/25/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2008);
Several practicing attorneys from throughout New England participated in the discussion,
along with representatives of the New England multispecies groundfish industry and sectors
experts from the Gulf of Maine Research Institute and Ocean Conservancy of New England.
66. See generally Sector Workshop Blog Archive, supra note 20 (including a link to the
conference weblog, speaker presentations, copies of the Pollock Cooperative membership
and Georges Bank Cod Hook Sector agreements, and detailed notes taken at meeting by
University of Maine School of Law students Tamara Norris and David Kallin).
67. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).  The Act provides that: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.  Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprison-
ment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.  
Id.  In addition to federal law, each state also has laws prohibiting anti-competitive behavior
for conduct that takes place entirely within the state.  See, e.g., Monopolies and Profiteering,
10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1101-1110 (2003); Massachusetts Antitrust Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93,
§§ 1-14A  (2005); Rhode Island Antitrust Act, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-36-1 (2000).  
III. LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY SECTORS AS A MANAGEMENT TOOL
A.  Sector Operating Agreements Workshop
The 2007 Sector Workshop65 was designed to address three primary
issues: (1) How to ensure that a sector agreement complies with existing
laws and regulations and how the regulatory process can be improved to
support successful sectors; (2) what legal entity a sector should choose and
the legal implications of that choice; and (3) how key terms of the sector
agreement can be drafted to maximize the sector’s effectiveness.66
B.  Resolving Antitrust Concerns
Monopolies and contracts that unreasonably restrain trade may run
afoul of antitrust laws.  The Sherman Antitrust Act makes it a crime for
competitors to form private agreements in certain circumstances.67
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68. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 2.
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70. See id.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 521 (2000).
72. Id.
73. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (2000); see also DAVID VOLKIN, UNDERSTANDING CAPPER-
VOLSTEAD 1-2 (1985), available at http://www.ezec.gov/rbs/pub/cir35.pdf (providing useful
resources on antitrust issues under CVA). 
74. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 3. 
75. Id.
76. United States v. Hinote, 823 F. Supp. 1350, 1354 (S.D. Miss. 1993).
Sometimes a court, applying the law to a potentially anticompetitive
arrangement, will analyze the case under a “rule of reason” approach that
considers “whether the agreement likely harms competition by increasing
the ability or incentive to profitably raise price above, or reduce output,
quality, service or innovation below, what likely would prevail in the
absence of the relevant agreement.”68  This involves evaluating the
particular facts of any given situation and coming to a reasonable conclu-
sion, but some arrangements between competitors are considered so likely
to harm competition and have negative consequences on U.S. consumers
that they are considered “per se” violations.69  It is well understood that
absent an express legal exemption an agreement among harvesters of a
resource to share or divide that resource collectively would be held per se
illegal.70
Luckily for those who would join fish harvesting cooperatives and
sectors, the Fishermen’s Collective Marketing Act (FCMA)71 creates such
an exemption provided that certain conditions are met.  Under the FCMA,
“[p]ersons engaged in the fishing industry . . . collectively catching,
producing, preparing for market, processing, handling and marketing” their
fish are not liable under federal antitrust law.72
The FCMA is patterned after its predecessor, the Capper-Volstead Act
(CVA), which exempts qualified agricultural producers from antitrust
liability under certain circumstances.73  Cases interpreting the CVA, which
are deemed applicable precedent for purposes of interpreting the FCMA,
underscore the importance of membership criteria for joining a cooperative
association.74  To determine whether members of a CVA or FCMA
association qualify for the exemption, a court will consider “the nature of
the association’s activities, the degree of integration of the member
producers, and the functions historically performed by the farmers (or, in
the case of the FCMA, of the fisherman) in the industry.”75  Significantly,
each member of the proposed association must qualify for the exemption
in order for the association, as a whole, to qualify.76
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80. A sector member is more likely to comply with the antitrust exemption standards if
he or she is a catcher/fisher rather than a processor with limited investment in harvesting
capacity.  The distinction must be evaluated under all the circumstances including: (1)
primary activity; (2) resource allocation; (3) initial activity; (4) volume; and (5) value.  
81. Sullivan, supra note 17, at 4-5.
If a cooperative association or “sector” arrangement involves only fish
harvesting by catcher vessel—and not also processing or marketing
activities—the prevailing view is that the exemption should easily be met.77
By producing a lower cost product for consumers such arrangements may
be more efficient and competitive.78  This type of association may be the
kind originally envisioned by Congress in passing the FCMA.79  This
provides greater certainty for New England multispecies groundfish sectors
because members can rely on the FCMA exemption for their association if
each member of the sector is a fisherman and is not also a fish processor or
otherwise vertically integrated.80
If the Pacific whiting fishery is any indication a harvesting sector may
receive the FCMA exemption even if one or more catcher members are also
a processor.  The Pacific whiting fishery broke important ground when its
cooperative, which involved catcher/processor vessels, received assurances
from the US Department of Justice Antitrust Division that the association
did not violate antitrust law.81  The cooperative’s attorney explained the
circumstances as follows:
The Pacific whiting fishery, like many others in the region, is
managed under a strict annual sectoral harvest limit.  In addition,
as is the case in many others of these fisheries, the catcher/ pro-
cessor sector’s allocation of the Pacific whiting fishery was being
fully harvested each year, and could easily have been harvested
within each annual fishing season with much less capacity.  In
traditional antitrust terms, the fishery was operating in a regulated
output setting.  In fact, all indications were that a harvesting share
arrangement could well have a converse effect from that normally
assumed, i.e., that it would result in more product being produced
at a lower unit cost from the same fixed quantity of fish. 
Informal contacts with Antitrust Division staff confirmed that
market allocation agreements among competitors (including highly
vertically integrated competitors) in a regulated output setting
could qualify for rule of reason analysis under appropriate circum-
stances.  These discussions also suggested that it was reasonable
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85. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dept. Justice Antitrust Div.,
to Joseph M. Sullivan, Partner, Mundt MacGregor L.L.P. (May 20, 1997) (on file with the
author).
86. Assuming a cooperative entity is properly formed under the FCMA, as addressed
below, it may engage in some activities that might otherwise violate antitrust laws.  Kitts &
Edwards, supra note 33.  For instance, members can agree on terms of sale and on minimum
prices to accept for products, and may negotiate with a single buyer.  Id.  Certain limitations
apply; for example, exempt cooperatives may not enhance prices through unfair production
limitations or force buyers into sole supplier agreements.  Id.  They may not, for example,
obtain monopoly power through alliances with non-exempt firms or force non-members to
use the cooperative.  Id.
87. To receive NMFS approval a sector must, among other things, designate an agent for
service of process and a plan for management rules by which each member will abide. 50
C.F.R. 648.87(b)(2)(iii).  These tasks are more easily coordinated through a corporate entity.
to expect a favorable business review from the Division if the pro-
posed harvesting arrangement would increase efficiency and pro-
ductivity, and the related products were marketed competitively.82
Once the four catcher/processor companies in the Pacific whiting
fishery had negotiated a harvesting share allocation agreement and prepared
formal corporate documentation for the “White Conservation Cooperative,”
their attorney submitted the drafts to the Antitrust Division for a business
review.83  Among the documents submitted for review was a formal
membership agreement much like those required of New England ground-
fish sector participants.84  The Division ultimately issued a “no enforcement
intention” letter in which it stated that “it does not appear that the proposed
elimination of the olympic system race to gather the governmentally-fixed
quota of Pacific Whiting would have any incremental anticompetitive effect
in the regulated output setting in which the harvesting agreement would
take place” and noted the Division was “not presently inclined to initiate
antitrust enforcement action against the proposed harvesting agreement.”85
Counsel to a new sector should not assume that the sector and each of
its members will qualify for an FCMA exemption to avoid per se antitrust
liability, or otherwise satisfy the “rule of reason” approach before a federal
judge.  Instead, counsel should consider seeking a business review opinion
from the Antitrust Division if any questions linger about antitrust liability.86
C.  Selecting and Managing the Sector’s Corporate Form
A sector should select a corporate form and create a governance
system.87  The entity may be a for-profit corporation, but if current
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88. See Donald Kassilke, Remarks at the Sector Operating Agreements Workshop,
http://mainelaw.maine.edu/mli/sectorWorkshop/ent04.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2008)
(stating that the Cape Cod Commercial Hook Sector is organized under section 501(c)(3) of
the U.S. Tax Code).
89. See Sullivan Remarks, supra note 39.  
90. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(5) (2000).
91. I.R.C. § 501(c)(6).
92. Sullivan Remarks, supra note 39. It may also be appropriate for the entity to
incorporate under Delaware law to take advantage of limited liability provisions.
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 521; see also Kitts & Edwards, supra note 33.
94. See, e.g., Christopher S. McLoon, The Ins and Outs of Limited Liability Companies
in Maine 28-29 (National  Business Institute 2005).
95. Id. at 29-30. 
96. See Sullivan Remarks, supra note 39.  
97. Id.
examples in the Northeast groundfish fishery remain a model for future
sectors, a non-profit corporate form that qualifies for tax exempt status
under federal law may be more appropriate.88  Pacific Northwest coopera-
tives have been formed89 as tax-exempt aquaculture associations,90 and
trade associations.91
To avoid antitrust issues, the sector may also be a non-stock corpora-
tion formed consistently with state corporation laws.92  Under the FCMA,
the organizational structure of a corporation seeking antitrust exemption
must: (1) consist of fishermen with a vested ownership interest engaged in
production or catching; (2) be “operated for the mutual benefit of the
members thereof”; (3) limit dealings in products not produced by its
members; (4) allow one vote per member; and (5) pay no more than eight
percent annually in dividends.93
Attorneys at the 2007 Sector Operating Agreements Workshop
concluded that the choice of a non-profit corporation versus a non-profit
limited liability company (LLC) did not have a significant bearing on
management or function of the sector.  An LLC requires few administrative
formalities.94  A corporation is required to have a board of directors, annual
meetings, and other formalities.95  It may be more appropriate to choose a
corporate form that obligates the sector to operate formally. 
Attorney Sullivan explained that his cooperative harvesting clients in
the Pacific Northwest typically wanted the ability to get in and out of a
sector as an individual business.96  They wanted to avoid the perception of
a “joint venture” that may inadvertently create interrelated financial
obligations or the perception that the harvested asset was owned jointly by
the group.  In his experience, with a corporate structure it is easier to
separate the members’ individual financial arrangements from the sector’s
management regime.97
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99. Kassilke, supra note 88.  According to Attorney Kassilke, the Georges Bank Hook
Sector is a nonprofit corporation organized under I.R.C. § 501(c)(5).  Id.  Each member has
one vote and a Board of Directors consisting of up to nine members.  Id.  The manager is
crucial to administration of the sector, enforcement of the operating agreement, and
communication with government agencies.  Id.
100. Tamara Norris, Notes of Sector Operating Agreement Workshop 26, http://mainelaw.
maine.edu/mli/sectorWorkshop/pdf/workshop_notes_norris.pdf  (last visited, Nov. 5, 2008).
101. Id.
102. Eric Brazer, Remarks at the Sector Operating Agreements Workshop (2007),
http://mainelaw.maine.edu/mli/sectorWorkshop/ent06.html.  Mr. Brazer, manager of the
Georges Bank Cod Hook Sector, explained that fishermen in Chatham and Harwichport,
Massachusetts, formed the first Northeast Multispecies fishing sector after meeting in
basements and bars to formulate a strategy for economic survival in an increasingly stressed
fishery.  Id.  Thus, the members are personally familiar with each other and, by agreement, the
fishing area and landing ports are limited to those individuals known to current members.  Id.
103. See 50 C.F.R. § 648.87.  This is in contrast to the Pacific Northwest pollock fishery,
where in-shore applicants must be admitted.  Sullivan Remarks, supra note 39.  Off-shore
Typical corporate documents for a sector are the articles of incorpora-
tion, bylaws, and the operation or membership agreement (Agreement).
Articles of incorporation and bylaws establish management structure and
authority, voting rights, and membership eligibility.98  It is generally
advised that the sector have a Board of Directors and a Board-selected
manager.99  While the Board must have significant management authority,
many self-governance issues related to the membership agreement may be
made by the members on their own initiative.100  Most also consider the
way in which decisions are made.101  Compensation of sector administrators
—in particular the manager but also any staff—should be described in the
bylaws as well.  The Agreement should address certain essential terms for
proper sector operation.
D.  The Operations or Membership Agreement: 
Key Sector Contract Terms
1.  Membership
As noted above, community-based management schemes tend to be
most effective when participants live and work in close proximity, are
limited in number, and share similar styles and methods of fishing (e.g.
gear, vessel size, etc.).  These characteristics exist with the cod fishermen
of Cape Cod participating in the Georges Bank Hook and Fixed Gear
sectors.102  Amendment 13 does not set limits or obligations on any sector’s
membership, which is strictly voluntary.103
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applicants are admitted at the cooperative’s discretion.  Id.  As Attorney Sullivan noted,
monitoring and enforcement is much easier under the voluntary regime than one where the
cooperative is forced to include members.  Id.
104. 50 C.F.R. § 648.87(b)(1)(iii).
105. Id. § 648.87(b)(2)(v).
106. Id. § 648.87(b)(1)(iii).
107. See id. § 648.82(d)(3) (prohibiting fishing on “C” days).  A relevant provision
regarding eligibility in the Georges Bank (GB) Cod Hook Sector reads:
Each Member has been issued a limited access multispecies permit, which (i) is based
on a documented landing of GB cod between May 1, 1996, and April 30, 2002, which
are the 1996 through 2001 fishing years . . . (“Qualifying Period”), (ii) is related to
a minimum of 5,000 pounds of regulated species landings in the baseline year during
the Qualifying Period and (iii) has received an allocation of “A” or “B” Days-At-Sea
(“DAS”) from NMFS under Amendment 13 for the 2007 fishing year.
GEORGES BANK COD HOOK SECTOR, OPERATIONS PLAN AND AGREEMENT art. I § 1.01
(2007), available at http://mainelaw.maine.edu/mli/sectorWorkshop/pdf/hook_sector_
operating_agreement.pdf [hereinafter GEORGES BANK PLAN].
108. See Sullivan Remarks, supra note 39.  A question was raised at the workshop about
adapting the existing agreements for the pollock cooperative and Georges Bank Cod sector
to fit a real-life New England groundfish sector involving multiple fish stocks and a range
of corporate and individual members living in diverse places.  Id.  In response, Joseph
Sullivan, answered that, unless there is a history of effective cooperation, such groups are
best kept to ten or fewer members with similar interests, social, or cultural relationships.  Id.
It would also help to have some agreements already reached informally about allocation
before taking the formal and expensive step of preparing an operating plan.  Id.  If many
questions remain unanswered or contentious, it might be better to hire a consultant to assist
the members in reaching consensus before hiring an attorney to draft the sector plan.  Id.
Because the sector’s allocation of catch or effort is based upon the
“documented accumulated catch histories of the harvested stock(s) for each
vessel electing to fish in a sector,”104 the membership agreement must
obligate sector members to disclose their catch or effort history.105  Under
Amendment 13, the relevant history period is the five years prior to
submission of a sector allocation proposal.106  If a sector allocation is based
on effort, or days at sea, then sectors will want to see proof that members
have “A” or “B” days, both of which allow fishing effort rather than “C”
days, which prohibit fishing.107  Furthermore, the membership agreements
also require participating members to prove that their fishing permits and
the vessels to which they apply have no sanctions or restrictions that would
prevent enrollment or participation in the sector.
Initial membership may be decided upon personal relationships and
other factors that cause fishing vessel owners and operators to join together
in a sector arrangement.108  New membership thereafter may be decided by
petition or application, subject to approval by the Board of Directors.
Members will want to have effective screening methods and be certain that
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109. 50 C.F.R. § 648.87(b)(1)(v).   
110. GEORGES BANK PLAN, supra note 107, art. III §§ 3.03-3.04.
111. See, e.g. 50 C.F.R. 648.87.
112. Sullivan Remarks, supra note 39.   
new members are not added that, because of their fishing history, cause the
aggregate fishing history of the sector to exceed the sector’s allocation.
The sector must have the authority and ability to collect dues from
members to cover administrative costs.  Up-front administrative expenses
can be substantial because the sector must submit an environmental assess-
ment, consistent with NEPA,109 and pay attorneys to assist with corporate
documentation.  To prevent new members from unfairly benefiting from the
efforts of other members, new members could be required to pay dues
sufficient to off-set some of the start-up costs borne by founding members.
2.  Administration
Each sector needs a manager with authority to handle the day-to-day
issues the sector will face, to work with government authorities, answer
members’ questions, and even be responsible for monitoring and reporting
with regard to catch.  The manager will also take the lead on generating and
submitting the annual operations plan and agreement, preparing and sub-
mitting the required annual report to the NEFMC, and creating or working
with any committees the sector may find necessary to its operations.  For
instance, the Georges Bank Cod Hook Sector has an infractions committee,
which it uses to investigate and recommend sanctions for any members
accused of violating the contract and/or any federal fishing regulations.110
3.  Catch Allocation
Each sector member is entitled to an allocation of the sector’s total
catch (known as its Annual Catch Allotment or ACE), to be determined by
the sector members.111  One mechanism for allocating catch among
members is to base the individual allocations on the member’s fishing
history for the same years as the sector’s allocation (e.g., 1996-2006).
Sector members could agree among themselves to any arrangements they
deem equitable.  If catch histories are kept confidential by the Council
(which is true for both the Pacific Northwest and the New England fishery
management councils) then it may be necessary to involve a third-party
auditor rather than requiring sector members to disclose their catch
histories to each other.112  After all, the members were essentially competi-
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113. See GEORGES BANK PLAN, supra note 107, art. IV §§ 4.02-4.03 (providing that Board
may reserve up to five percent of sector’s aggregate allocation to ensure compliance with
aggregate allocation limit).  See also Verani, supra note 5, at 369 (providing a detailed
discussion of the Georges Bank Cod Hook Sector (GBCHS)). 
114. See generally 50 C.F.R. 648.87. 
115. See Draft Amendment 16, supra note 51.  
116. 50 C.F.R. § 648.87(b)(1)(xiii).
117. See GEORGES BANK PLAN, supra note 107, art. II § 2.05. 
118. 50 C.F.R. § 648.87(b)(1)(ix) (“It shall be unlawful to violate [the conditions and
requirements of an Operating Plan] and each Sector, vessel, and vessel operator and/or
vessel owner participating in the Sector may be charged jointly and severally for…civil
penalties and permit sanctions pursuant to 15 CFR part 904.”).
119. Id.
tors before joining a sector and may again return to that status when they
withdraw from the sector.
A sector may wish to agree not to allocate all of the sector’s ACE to the
members, but rather to hold some of it in reserve.  This provides a cushion
against accidentally exceeding the ACE as well as an opportunity for a
year-end “bonus” to members if the ACE is not exceeded.113
4.  Allocation Transfer
Presently, sector members can trade their allocation within the sector
to other members, but the sector is not yet officially authorized to trade
ACE with other sectors.114    This is likely to change through proposed
Amendment 16 of the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan.115
Mechanisms for intra-sector ACE trading should be addressed in the sector
operating agreement.  In addition, a member can be prohibited from
transferring his other fishing permit during the fishing year subject to the
sector agreement, unless the purchaser or transferee agrees to be bound by
the terms of the sector agreement.116  Often the purchaser may participate
only for the remainder of the fishing year, after which it must apply for
membership.117  If the NEFMC allows inter-sector trading of ACE, the
sector agreement must also address mechanisms and rules for such transfer.
5.  Monitoring and Reporting
Members of an approved sector and the sector itself may be held jointly
and severally liable for any member’s violations of either federal fishing
laws or the sector’s operating agreement.118  Moreover, all operating
agreements must include a clause to that effect.119  For a sector to succeed,
2008] Managing Fisheries Through Contract 37
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121. BRUCE TERRIS & HOWARD MCELDERRY, EVALUATION OF MONITORING AND
REPORTING NEEDS FOR GROUNDFISH SECTORS IN NEW ENGLAND PHASE I REPORT 5 (2008),
available at http://gmri.org/upload/files/GroundfishMonitoringNeedsPhaseIReportb.pdf.
122. See Draft Amendment 16, supra note 51, at 54 (stating that proposed Amendment 16
would obligate sectors to develop and implement a “dockside monitoring program”).
123. See Petruny-Parker, supra note 32, at 9-11 (describing development of community-
based management in the Fundy Fixed Gear Council).
124. GEORGES BANK PLAN, supra note 107, art. V § 5.01.
125. Id. art. V § 5.02.
126. Id. art. V § 5.04.  Landings in other ports are permitted on a temporary, case-by-case
basis with the manager’s approval.  Id. art. V § 5.05.
127. Id. art. V § 5.06.
it must have a means to monitor each member’s fishing activities and catch
landings, and accurately report that information to NMFS. 
One mechanism for monitoring is the requirement that participating
sector or cooperative members carry an independent observer on board.
This method was favored by the Pollock cooperative and the Pacific
Whiting cooperative, the contracts for which obligated each member to host
and pay for a federal observer on each vessel.120  This works well for a
fishery that has historically used the federal observer system and that is
comprised of larger trawl vessels.121
New England groundfish fishermen are less likely to submit to an
obligatory observer system as a condition of sector membership.122  Like
the Fundy Fixed Gear Council of Nova Scotia, in Canada, New England
sectors may prefer a more informal observation method employing
representatives (typically fishermen) to monitor wharves and catch
activities rather than hiring observers to monitor individual vessels.123  The
Georges Bank Cod Hook Sector monitors fishing activity by requiring
members to provide the Hook Sector Manager with a report of each trip’s
entire catch “on a landing-by-landing basis, by providing the Manager with
a copy of the official Vessel Trip Report or other reporting document or
system authorized by NMFS within 48 hours of offloading fish.”124
Monitoring is further aided by the members’ agreement to sell their catch
only to a dealer licensed by NFMS and to authorize that dealer to provide
the Manager, on a weekly basis, with an “official dealer weigh out slip” or
other NMFS-approved document.125   Members also agree to offload fish only
in certain designated ports.126  The Manager may require that observers be
present during offloading operations.127
Additionally, electronic systems exist to monitor fishing activity and
catch.  In the Pacific Northwest, for instance, NMFS observers send infor-
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128. John R. Gauvin, Karl Haflinger & Mary Nerini, Solving Bycatch: Considerations for
Today and Tomorrow, in SOLVING BYCATCH:CONSIDERATIONS FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW
(University of Alaska Sea Grant College Program, 1995), http://www.groundfishforum.org/
Project/SeaState/SeaStBdy.html.  An article about the Sea State program explains the pro-
cess as follows:
In our program, observer data on catch and bycatch are electronically transmitted
from each vessel to the Sea State office in Seattle.  Sea State conducts statistical
expansions from observer data to calculate an average bycatch rate per vessel for the
24 hour period.  Daily bycatch rates are then placed into a format where the
relationship between bycatch rates and locations is accessible to skippers and their
companies. The format currently in use plots each vessel’s daily bycatch rate on a
chart of the fishing grounds. Sea State relays this information to the vessels and owner
companies every 24 hours via fax or by a computer file loaded into a plotting program
provided to the vessel.  The need for a private contractor to implement this program
exists because NMFS does not have sufficient resources for data processing and
transmission of bycatch information in a time frame suitable for bycatch avoidance.
Further, government rules pertaining to confidentiality allow individual companies
to receive only their own fishing data which is not always useful for establishing
bycatch trends.  The contract with Sea State works through a general clearance
agreement between participating companies, NMFS, and Sea State. This allows for
the calculation of bycatch rates per ton of target catch while providing protection from
general dissemination of individual catch data.  
Id.
129. See Office for Law Enforcement, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ole/vms.html (last
visited Oct. 24, 2008).
130. TERRIS & MCELDERRY, supra note 121, at 3. 
131. Id. at 2-3, 7.
132. Id. at 7.
133. Id. at 2.
mation electronically to a third party—Sea State, Inc.—which compiles the
information and shares it with NMFS as well as the vessel owner.128
NOAA’s Office of Law Enforcement also uses a satellite-based vessel
monitoring system (VMS) to track vessel location and compliance with
area restrictions. 129  These systems could be employed in combination with
other monitoring tools. 130  Indeed, experts have identified up to eleven
tools that should be combined and phased in over time, with the entire
monitoring program contracted to a single service provider during the first
five years of implementation.131  They further recommend that the monitor-
ing program’s costs be covered in part by the industry so that the program
is used more “responsibly and efficiently.”132  Such a program should lead
to a more accurate accounting of both the total catch and released fish
mortality, which should lead to a more sustainable fishery.133
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fishing’ order from the Sector, which shall be issued by the Board, the Manager or the
[Infractions] Committee” and failure to do so may result in an injunction or retraining order
to enforce the “stop fishing” order.  GEORGES BANK PLAN, supra note 107, art. VI § 6.02.
135. POLLOCK COOPERATIVE MEMBERSHIP AGREEMENT 3, available at http://mainelaw.
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136. Id. at 4.      
6.  Enforcement
Undoubtedly, sector agreement provisions concerning enforcement
measures and sanctions for contract breach and legal violators will be
among the most controversial ones.  Conflict and mistrust can arise because
sector members must agree to be jointly and severally liable for the mis-
conduct of their former competitors.  They must thus be able to trust one
another and trust the system to keep all members in compliance. There must
be fair and reliable procedures for investigating allegations, the ability to
stop any ongoing violations quickly, and appropriate mechanisms for
recovering damages to the sector and its members. 
If a member exceeds his or her allocation, this may put the sector’s
allocation (ACE) in jeopardy.  The operations agreement must have a
mechanism for injunctive relief to immediately halt an offending member’s
activity.134  In a well-monitored system, when one member accidentally
exceeds his or her individual allotment, the sector should be able to help
that member acquire more from another member.  Additionally, the sector
should help manage the aggregate activity of its members to ensure the
ACE is not exceeded.
Monetary damages awarded against an offender may also be appro-
priate, depending on the activity that triggers them and the laws of the state
governing the contract.  The Pollock cooperative contract, for example, sets
a forfeiture amount for each species covered by the agreement.135  If a
member harvests more than his percentage of any particular species he is
obliged to pay the sector an amount equal to the forfeiture amount
multiplied by the number of metric tons harvested in excess of the allocation.
The cooperative gives the allegedly non-compliant member fifteen days’
notice of its intent to collect the forfeiture amount, during which time the
member can make the payment voluntarily, contest the collection, or propose
an alternative outcome.  Collected funds are dispersed on a pro-rata basis to
other cooperative members.  The Pollock cooperative agreement also
mandates both the payment of actual damages over and above the forfeiture
amount, as well as the payment of any litigation costs incurred by the
cooperative in collecting the forfeiture or damages. 136
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The Georges Bank Cod Hook Sector Agreement includes a schedule of
penalties for several violations.137  These are in addition to the costs and
attorney’s fees incurred by the sector or its members for enforcing the
agreement.138  Fines and penalties that are collected are applied in the
following order: (1) to the costs of enforcement;139 (2) to the sector’s
“administration, management, and preservation;”140 and (3) to “further
research into efficient management of groundfish stocks for the benefit of
the resource and those that harvest the resource.”141  The manager is
authorized to enforce the agreement and impose penalties.142  The manager
may also request assistance from a board-appointed infractions committee,
which prepares the schedule of penalties and investigates alleged
infractions.143
In some states, including Maine, contracts cannot have provisions that
impose a “penalty” for their breach.144  Clauses setting forth fixed or
“liquidated” damages are valid only if the damages caused by breach of the
contract would be difficult to accurately estimate and the fixed amount is
a reasonable forecast of what it would take to justly compensate the harmed
party.145  If the damages clause demands amounts in excess of reasonable
and just compensation that clause may be deemed an unenforceable
penalty.146  Accordingly, in states where penalty clauses can be held void
in a contract, the monetary fines imposed for breach of the Sector Agree-
ment must be reasonably tied to just compensation owed the sector or any
of its members.
2008] Managing Fisheries Through Contract 41
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 876, 878 (1997); see generally Bigelow v. Old
Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912); McDermott, Inc. v.
AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994).
148. GEORGES BANK PLAN, supra note 107, art. VI § 6.09.
149. Id. 
150. 50 C.F.R. § 648.87(b)(1)(xi). 
151. NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL,SECTOR POLICY 2 (2007), available
at http://www.nefmc.org/issues/sector_omnibus/Sector%20Policy%20Statement_7%
2007.pdf. 
152. Pollock, supra note 135, at 6.
7.  Indemnification
Joint and several liability refer to the legal relationship between
multiple parties when at least one of them causes redressable harm or
otherwise violates the law.  Joint liability allows any member of a sector to
be sued for the full amount of damages.  Several liability means that each
party causing redressable harm is responsible only for their own share of
the fault.147  In other words, the government may sue any sector member to
recover all of the damages caused by one of them and that member then
may sue any of the others to recover their share of the damages. 
The key to sector enforcement and liability issues, therefore, is a solid
indemnification provision in the sector agreement.  The Georges Bank Cod
Hook Sector agreement, for example, obliges each member to severally
agree to indemnify, defend and hold harmless the other parties to the
agreement for their respective losses.148  It further specifies that “[t]he
indemnification obligations of the parties hereto shall be several and not
joint and several.”149
8.  Term and Termination
Amendment 13 requires that any vessel owner or operator, entering a
binding sector contract, must participate for the entire fishing year.  The
operating agreement must also reflect this requirement.150  Sectors may
wish to allow members to renew the term each year provided NMFS
approves the next fishing year’s sector proposal.  Because of the expense
of preparing annual proposals, the NEFMC is considering allowing multi-
year sector authorizations.151
The Pollock cooperative agreement has a perpetual term and can be
terminated by any two members upon the occurrence of certain enumerated
events including: (1) a determination that the cooperative violates antitrust
or unfair competition law;152 (2) the transfer of a member’s vessel through
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bankruptcy or insolvency order to a party not bound by the agreement;153
(3) termination of the cooperative’s allocation;154 (4) or members’ notice
of termination in advance of the end of the calendar year.155
9.  Controlling Law
In the New England multispecies groundfish fishery, vessel owners and
operators may join a sector with members residing in a different state.
While residential and cultural similarities may be useful to a successful
community-based management system, the sector system of Amendment 13
does not obligate participants to live near each other.156  Accordingly,
choice of law considerations may become an issue for negotiation of a
sector agreement should members hail from different states.  If all partici-
pants are from a single state then typically that state’s law would apply.
The Cape Cod fishermen joining the Georges Bank Hook and Fixed Gear
sectors specified that the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts would
govern their sector agreement.157  Given Maine’s aversion to penalty
provisions in contracts, sectors with members from Maine and Massachusetts
may also elect Massachusetts law as governing their agreement.  
IV. OUTCOMES, OBSERVATIONS, AND RESOURCES
Groups that have been able to successfully manage a commons over
time without overexploiting it tend to have well-defined boundaries, rules
linked to local conditions, and sanctions imposed for rules violations. 158
They are also characterized by a strong community tradition and the
absence of government interference.159
The two examples of New England-based groundfish sectors that
currently exist—both based out of Cape Cod—meet a bulk of these criteria.
They are familiar to each other, they generally fish out of the same ports
and within a familiar geographic boundary, and they both have their
contract and traditional social norms to sanction misbehavior.160  Because
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they live in the same community, they can translate their local traditions
into a formal agreement.  What is not clear is the extent to which govern-
ment interference will be necessary as the sector operates over time.  If it
functions as Amendment 13 envisions, there is little role for government
apart from approving the sector’s existence and operating terms at the
outset.
The regulatory structure created by the MSA still persists.  Each sector
is highly regulated and subject to government oversight.161  A reality of
sector-based management is that some of the functions typically paid and
performed by the government have been shifted to, or shared with, the
industry.  Monitoring and enforcement is, under a sector arrangement, now
a responsibility of the fishermen.  Another responsibility is the cost of
initially establishing the management scheme, as represented by the fees
associated with generating an environmental assessment consistent with
NEPA and preparing an operating agreement and plan.  Those obligations
typically involve engaging experts and paying their customary fees. 
Many agree that community-based management is a scheme the New
England groundfish fishery should implement to more successfully manage
the resource.162  Already, efforts are under way toward this goal.  Several
granting agencies and private foundations have provided support for service
and education organizations that can benefit groundfish fishermen.163  The
Gulf of Maine Research Institute is a perfect example of this phenomenon.
Experts in economics, fisheries management, collaborative research and
neutral convening work closely with potential sectors on such issues as
preparing environmental assessments and NEFMC sector proposals.164
They also help individual vessel owners interested in joining a sector
determine their vessel’s catch history through NFMS.165  Their legal
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counsel, who was closely involved in the workshop, is now developing a
term sheet and model sector contract that should serve as a template for
New England groundfish sectors grappling with the key issues discussed in
this report.166  Additionally, they recently commissioned expert assistance
to study and make recommendations on monitoring and reporting needs for
sectors.167  These activities are fundamentally important to fishermen
considering joining a sector.  They are funded by a private foundation that
appreciates the future significance of sectors in the New England
groundfish fishery and hopes to help support its successful development
and industry implementation.168
Significant support from non-profit and academic institutions may be
the only way some New England groundfish sectors can affordably form
and operate.  By adopting a community-based management system with
significant government interference, the NEFMC has created an expensive
but potentially effective opportunity for groundfish fishermen to self-
manage.
V. CONCLUSION
The NEFMC is currently working on Amendment 16 to the Multi-
species Groundfish FMP.  That amendment will further clarify sector
regulations.  Many speculate that up to half of the participants in the
groundfish fishery may participate in sectors in the near future, forming
between 12 and 19 sector arrangements.169
As new sector proposals are prepared for the New England multi-
species groundfish fishery, the obligatory sector plan and agreement will
likely develop a model form useful across sectors.  The Sector Operating
Agreements Workshop was intended not only to begin a dialogue to
develop those terms, but also to encourage attorneys and others working
with sectors to share their final contracts openly with each other to keep
costs under control.  Through collaborative efforts on behalf of the legal
community, the fishing industry, fishery regulators, and nonprofit support
institutions, community-based management may indeed take hold and
succeed in the New England groundfish fishery.
